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In Texas, Life Is Cheap
Frank Cross
Charles Silver
59 Vand. L. Rev. 1875 (2006)
This article examines the valuation of human life in the
Texas tort compensation system.
Using a large database that
reports settlement amounts in over 11,000 cases seeking
compensation for death, we find that the median settlement
compensation is around $200,000. This is far below the $5-$6
million used by administrativeagencies, which base their valuation
of human life upon economic studies.
We also examine the
determinants of compensation for death. The data show that
compensation corresponds to legal standardsfor damages valuation,
such as expected income loss. However, compensation in these cases
is also significantly affected by other factors, such as insurance
policy limits, location of injury, and nature of the defendant. We
propose the adoption of a presumptive minimum award in wrongful
death cases, to correct for undercompensation and associated
underdeterrence
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What is the life of a Texan worth? Some might suggest very
little. Payments in thousands of tort cases in which Texans died
provide some evidence for this hypothesis. Although Texas has been a
focus of much of the national controversy over the costs of tort
litigation, 1 payments in death cases have seen relatively little
disciplined research. Existing research often misses the primary effect
of the system because it focuses on trial outcomes rather than
settlement payments. This Article provides some evidence of the
actual payments made in Texas in death cases, their determinants,
and the implications of those findings for tort policy.
Death cases provide a particularly useful tool for studying the
effect of the tort compensation system, because the actual injury
suffered is constant across all cases (though damages will differ
among individuals). Moreover, appropriate economic valuation for
death has been particularly well studied in economics scholarship and
by government agencies. The context enables an analysis of how
appropriate (legally and theoretically) tort compensation payments
are.
The first Section examines the legal structure for the valuation
of life in different institutional settings. Administrative agencies have
set quantitative economic values for life-saving, in order to assess the
propriety of adopting protective regulations. These values have been
grounded closely in a very large body of social scientific research that
measures the economic valuation that individuals place on protecting
their lives. In addition, the 9-11 Compensation Commission placed a
value on life in determining the amount of payments to the next of kin
of those who died in the terrorist attack. Furthermore, the legal
system has its own rules for assessing tort damages. The legal
system's rules are more restrictive and generally do not attempt to
fully capture the value of life.
The second Section describes the data used in this analysis,
which is drawn from an extensive database maintained by the Texas
Department of Insurance on closed claims. Here we describe the data
and some of its limitations. The third Section examines the actual
valuation of life in the Texas tort compensation system using this
database. We find that the typical payment in death cases is quite low,
far less than the valuation suggested by the social science research on
life valuation. This is in part due to the restrictive standards for
damages of tort law, which limit the recoverable damages. We also

1.
See Michael L. Rustad, NationalizingTort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue
Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 711 (1996) ("Reformers consider Texas
as a hot spot in the country for jury verdicts.").
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find that several legally inappropriate factors (such as insurance
coverage, location, and nature of defendant) are statistically
significant determinants of death payments in these claims.
The fourth and final Section examines the policy implications
of these findings and makes reform proposals. The value of life in the
tort compensation system is far too low to induce the optimal
deterrence of death-causing behavior by potential defendants.
Moreover, the damages paid through the compensation system are
infected by various inappropriate determinants. Therefore, we suggest
a schedule providing a presumptive amount of damages for death at a
level high enough to improve the system's ability to deter potential
tortfeasors.
I.

VALUATION OF LIFE BY DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS

Although it is common to speak of human life as priceless, the
law cannot treat it as such. 2 Society has limited resources for lifesaving precautions and for compensation of lost lives, and as a result
the law must attach a price tag to human life. The law must decide
how many dollars people must spend to avoid harming others, and
how much compensation must be paid for death caused by negligence.
The valuation of life occurs in two very distinct contexts: (1) the ex
ante value of unknown future losses of life used in designing
administrative regulations to prevent such losses and (2) the ex post
value of actual lives lost in the tort compensation system for providing
3
damages to survivors.
These two separate systems of legal life valuation have very
different aims. Regulation seeks to prevent actions that cause loss of
life. The primary goal of the tort system is to compensate survivors
when another party is legally responsible for causing a person's death.
Given these different goals, the two systems have developed very
different techniques for assigning monetary value to life. This Section
discusses the operation of both systems, as well as the administrative
compensation system established for survivors of those killed in the 911 tragedy.

2.
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1459
(1994) (noting that "moral absolutism is wholly untenable as a societal system of resource
allocation").
3.
An excellent review of these theories, on which we draw heavily for our study, is Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollarsand Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005).
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A. FederalAdministrativeAgencies
Federal administrative agencies have considerable experience
in assigning a value to human life. Regulators who make policy
choices in areas where deaths may result routinely take into account
the economic valuation of those deaths when promulgating
regulations. In addition, the 9-11 Compensation Commission had to
determine the appropriate level of compensation for survivors of those
who died in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. This
section reviews the decisions made in these contexts.
1. Value of a "Statistical Life" for Regulation
Any regulation that is aimed at saving lives and that is subject
to a statutory cost-benefit test must put some monetary value on the
lives it saves. Even when the statute does not contain an explicit costbenefit test, executive orders require some balancing of costs and
benefits, 4 and agencies typically consider this balance. The analysis of
agency valuation of life has been extensive, and thus our review is
necessarily very abbreviated.
Agency valuations of life are necessarily anonymous because
they are designed to prevent deaths. They generally identify few or
none of the features of the individual whose life is saved by the
regulation. 5 These are often called valuations of a "statistical life,"
because the regulations prevent statistical probabilities of future lives
lost. The typical regulation would protect against, say, a one-in-one
million risk of death in a population of ten million at risk. This
regulation would have an expected value of ten lives saved, so the
agency would assign a value for life, multiply it by ten, add up the
economic value of other regulatory benefits, and compare that sum to
the estimated costs of the regulation. This measure is sometimes
called the value of a statistical life ("VSL").
The ex ante VSL valuations of life by executive agencies are
relatively uniform (though they vary somewhat across agencies and
individual regulations). Such uniformity may be due in part to
administrative feasibility considerations, but the primary reason is
the lack of information about the nature of the lives to be saved.
4.
President Reagan issued dramatic Executive Order 12,291, which directed all executive
agencies to balance costs and benefits before regulating. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg.
13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). President Clinton modified this executive order with Executive Order
12,286 but endorsed the basic requirement of cost-benefit balancing before regulating. Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 601 (1993).
5.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation,54 DUKE L.J. 385, 386
(2004) (noting that "uniformity" is the practice of such agencies).
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Because the lives are statistical ones, the agency has relatively little
information about the characteristics of the individuals whose lives
are saved. 6 Hence, the agency must value human life in general, or
perhaps assign the median value of human lives.
To calculate the value of a life, the agencies have relied heavily
on econometric analyses of how people value their life in making their
life decisions. For example, one set of studies examines "wage
premiums." These are measures of the increased wages demanded by
workers in risky occupations to accept the greater risks to life
associated with those jobs. If workers demand a certain increased
wage to assume a certain increased risk of loss of life, those numbers
allow a calculation of the value assigned to life by the worker.7 This
measure captures all the life values appreciated by the workers in
question and surely incorporates a substantial measure of the
happiness of living, sometimes called hedonic value.
The wage premium studies have the virtue of using revealed
preferences based on the actual decisions of individuals. However,
they also have shortcomings. One problem with the wage premium
studies is that they assume workers are informed. If workers don't
appreciate the risks of death that they face, one can draw no valuation
inferences from their decisions. Some of the wage premium studies
have found life valuations of zero, 8 an implausible result that might be
explained by the fact that these workers don't know the risks they are
taking. An alternative explanation is the absence of a truly
competitive wage market, with non-unionized workers unable to
bargain for wage increases to compensate for risk.9 Other studies have
found very high wage premiums for accepting additional risk,
6.
The nature of the regulation provides some information about the lives at risk. For
example, an OSHA regulation will protect workers, not the unemployed. But this is relatively
little information, and other rules, such as environmental regulations designed to protect the
general public lack even this limited information about the characteristics of the individual lives
saved.
7.
If workers demanded an additional $1000 in wages for a job with an elevated risk to life
of 1 in 10,000, this would yield an implicit value of life of the worker at $10 million.
8.
There is considerable variance in the results of these studies. See Dennis C. Taylor,
Your Money or Your Life? Thinking about the Use of Willingness-To-Pay Studies to Calculate
Hedonic Damages, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1519, 1526 (1994) ("WTP studies produce a wide
range of estimates, from as low as $0 to as high as $15 million and beyond, for the value of a
statistical life.").
9.
See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work
Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 116, 134 (1998) (suggesting that non-unionized workers

in dangerous jobs are paid less than their counterparts in less dangerous jobs). Evidence for this
is found in research showing that union membership is associated with a higher VSL. See Alan
Krupnick, Valuing Health Outcomes: Policy Choices and Technical Issues, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE REP., Mar. 2004, at 50, available at http://www.rff.org/rff/DocumentsfRFF-RPTValuingHealthOutcomes.pdf.
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reaching $22 million. 10 In the presence of such variation, one might
question the reliability of the methodology, but some measure is
necessary for value quantification. A statistical approach known as
meta-analysis can combine the various studies to produce an overall
value. One such analysis found that most studies yielded a value
range between $3 and $7 million.1 ' The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") has used this research to set a life value of $6.77
million in its arsenic regulation.12
Wage premium studies are not the only source of market-based
estimates of life value. Some researchers have considered what people
are willing to pay to protect their lives with consumer goods, such as
smoke detectors. One set of studies involve auto safety purchases,
which have yielded varying valuations, but average around $3 to $4
million per life, based on the price consumers are willing to pay for
safer cars. 13 Other "studies have examined price-risk tradeoffs for
seatbelt use, cigarette smoking, home fire detectors, automobile
safety, bicycle helmets, and housing price responses to hazardous risk
sites. In general, these studies have found an implicit VSL on the
same order of magnitude as labor-market studies, though on average
slightly lower," which gives some basis for confidence in the results of
the research.14
Various heuristic features also complicate the valuation
process. For example, some research suggests that individuals put
different values on the loss of life, depending on its cause. Cancer, for
example, may be especially feared, and deaths from cancer given
greater value (at least for avoidance).1 5 Some research suggests that
altruism causes individuals to value others' lives more than their
own.1 6 This may actually be a feature of the control heuristic. People
take greater risks when they control the situation (an auto driver, for

10. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 23 (2003).
11. W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 441 (1995).
12. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2343
(2002). The rule itself is found at National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and
Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38888,
38897-98 (June 20, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141, 142).
13. Viscusi, supranote 11, at 443.
14. See Krupnick, supra note 9, at 50.
15. In one study, "the willingness to pay for cancer mortality reductions in the general
public was found to be twice that of reducing deaths by heart attack and three times that of
reducing deaths in automobile accidents." See id. at 58-59.
16. Id. at 47.
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example) than not (an auto passenger). 17 The revealed preference
research often involves circumstances in which the actor, such as the
worker, has at least some measure of control over risk, which could
yield a lower valuation. In addition, the valuation based on a
particular increase in risk seems to vary, depending on the magnitude
8
of the baseline risk on which it is superimposed.'
Another economic measure for the value of human life comes
from contingent valuation studies. These studies survey the amount
individuals are willing to pay to reduce a certain statistical increase in
risk of death. These studies are generally regarded as somewhat less
reliable because they are hypothetical, 19 and they do not require
subjects to "put their money where their mouth is." Researchers have
designed studies to compare the revealed preference studies, such as
those using wage premiums. While there is a rough association
between the results of the two, the contingent valuation stated
preference studies and found that the latter may produce a lower life
valuation. 20 The EPA used the contingent valuation studies in one of
its rules, setting the value of a life at $3.7 million based on five such
studies. 2' Taking this research into consideration, federal agencies
have converged on an estimate of the value of a life at between $5
million to $6.5 million. 22 This amount may be higher than justified by
the research. One comprehensive study found that the appropriate
VSL was less than $2.5 million. 23 The research does not permit one
single amount to be assigned as the VSL. Valuation may differ
depending on various circumstances. It is generally clear from the
research, however, that the appropriate VSL should be at least $2
million.

17. Andreas Teuber, Justifying Risk, 119 DAEDALUS 235, 236 (1990) ("[W]e respond
differently to risks ... over which we believe we have some degree of control.").
18. See J.R. Mrozek & L.O. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life? A Meta-Analysis, 21
J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253 (2002) (reporting change in VSL estimates as risk level
changed).
19. See Charles C. Fischer, Forensic Economics and the Hedonic Value of Life, J. LEGAL
ECON., July 1991, at 19-20 (noting that respondents in such studies "are asked to evaluate...
hypothetical situations often not found in markets" and the "values given by the respondents
may be their true, honest values but estimated with much uncertainty and subject to
biases/influences inherent in the design of any survey instrument").
20. See Krupnick, supra note 9, at 45-48.
21. The rule in question was the Nonroad Spark-Engine rule. See Control of Emissions
From Nonroad Large Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational Engines (Marine and LandBased), 67 Fed. Reg. 68242-01 (Nov. 8, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 89, 90, 91, 94, 1048,
1051, 1065, and 1068).
22. See Posner & Sustein, supra note 3, at 549.
23. Mrozek & Taylor, supra note 18, at 253.
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While the conventional regulatory decision placed a single
value on statistical human lives saved without any differentiation for
the characteristics of those lives, many have argued for a more
individuated approach, which would consider factors such as the age
of the individual life saved. 24 Because everyone eventually dies, lives
are not so much saved as they are extended. Because a younger person
has more life to live, some have suggested that their lives should be
valued more highly, and have proposed a measure known as qualityadjusted life years, or "QALYs." 25 This measure is used for a variety of
health impairments and is also directly translatable to lost life.
Some have argued that the use of QALYs provides a more
sophisticated basis for government regulators to value life than
measures that do not take age into account. 26 Professor Sunstein has
argued vigorously for the use of this measure in regulatory
decisionmaking. 27 He asserts that the policy is not discriminatory, but
simply recognizes that saving more years of life is better than saving
fewer years of life. QALYs have been increasingly considered in
28
making health care decisions.
While there is an obvious logic to age-dependent valuation, the
empirical research on life's value does not consistently support it. The
data supporting a reduced life valuation for the elderly has been
somewhat sketchy. 29 One study found that life valuations steadily
increase with age. 30 Another found that the wage premium data
supported a decrease as age increased, down to around $2.5 to $ 3

24. See generally Sunstein, supra note 5, at 390 (arguing VSLs should be individualized
because they vary across risks and because different individuals are willing to pay different
amounts to avoid risks).
25. A seminal article arguing for the use of this measure is Richard Zeckhauser & Donald
Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1976).
26. See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More ProtectionAgainst Risk
at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 33. A detailed analysis of the approach is provided by
Matthew D. Adler, Law and Psychology, Economics, and Biology: FearAssessment: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Pricingof Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977 (2004).
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness To Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
205, 245 (2004).
28. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1544
(1994) (noting that while no single system can solve the health care crisis, a QALY system offers
more advantages than others).
29. See Jeffrey C. Corey, Discounting, EPA's Nonroad Spark-Engine Rule, and the Hidden
Anti-Regulatory Agenda of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 77 (2004)
(critically reviewing the limited research cited by EPA for supporting such a differentiation);
Richard Raymond, The Use, or Abuse, of Hedonic Value-of-Life Estimates in PersonalInjury and
Death Cases, J. LEGAL ECON., Winter 1999-2000, at 73-74 (noting conflicting evidence).
30. See Corey, supra note 29, at 98 (reporting unpublished research finding this result).
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million for sixty year olds. 31 The contingent valuation studies have
32
also generally supported such a decline in value among the elderly.
However, if people tend to defer their life-cycle consumption until old
age, it might be appropriate to value elderly lives at a higher level
than those of the young. 33 Indeed, there is research that older workers
place a greater value on their life. 34 The Office of Management and
Budget tentatively embraced the age-dependent value of life
calculations under the EPA, valuing lives of those over seventy less.
The valuation was a controversial one, however, and was subsequently
35
abandoned.
The same theory that suggests that superannuated individual
lives might be valued less implies that the lives of young children
might be valued more highly as they have so many QALYs ahead of
them. The empirical evidence on this effect is mixed. A study on
parental purchases of bicycle safety helmets for children found an
implicit VSL of only around $2.7 million. 36 Other research has found
that children received a higher value, both absolutely and vis-a-vis
37
adults.
The regulatory valuations of life are clearly flawed to some
degree, though this does not render the regulatory effort unjustifiable.
Agencies must adopt some value for cost-benefit analysis, and they
have converged on values arrived at by using the best available
evidence. For our purposes, though, it is important to recognize the
flaws in the methods used to arrive at these values and to recognize
the fact that the flaws tend to result in an underestimation of life's
quantitative economic value. For example, one major theoretical flaw
of the wage premium studies involves a selection effect. Individuals
31. See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers' Value of Statistical
Life 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10199, 2003).
32. See id. at 3 (reviewing multiple studies).
33. See Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi, & James P. Ziliak, Life-Cycle Consumption
and the Age-Adjusted Value of Life 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10266,
2004) (suggesting that the lives of the elderly under these circumstances might be twice as
valuable as those of the young).
34. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 232 (reviewing a study that found that VSL increases
with age, from $7.4 million for workers between fifty-one and fifty-five, to $10.2 million for
workers between fifty-six to sixty, to $14 million for workers between sixty-one and sixty-five).
35. See John Tierney, Life: The Cost-Benefit Analysis, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at 14. For
some criticism of the age-based valuation, see Jocelyn Kaiser, How Much are Human Lives and
Health Worth?, SCIENCE, Mar. 21, 2003, at 1836-37.
36. See Robin R. Jenkins, Nicole Owens, & Lanelle Bembenek Wiggins, Valuing Reduced
Risks to Children: The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 397, 404 (2001).
37. See Glenn C. Blomquist, Ted R. Miller & David T. Levy, Values of Risk Reduction
Implied by Motorist Use of ProtectionEquipment, 30 TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 55, 64 (1996) (noting

that in automotive safety, parents valued children's lives at around $5 million, more than twice
the value of their own lives).
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may place very different values on risks of death.38 Employers in risky
occupations who want to minimize costs are likely to employ workers
who place a lower value on their lives, such as the risk-taking
individual rather than the risk-averse one. Thus, the wage premium
studies may measure only the value of life to risk-takers rather than
39
that of the median American.
Other factors also combine to produce an artificially low value
of life in the wage premium studies. These studies generally involve
blue collar workers with relatively low incomes. Because life valuation
increases with income, they will underestimate the value placed on
life by the "more representative" American. 40 Another shortcoming of
these studies (and all market-based studies) involves transaction
costs. The costs of discovering the magnitude of the risk, available
protection devices and their effectiveness, and the negotiating of such
protections involve transaction costs, which should be incorporated
into the valuation of life but are not measured by the research.
While the wage premium calculations contain some biases
causing the valuation of life to be underestimated, they may also
overestimate its value. For example, the same protective measures
that prevent loss of life also probably prevent serious injuries. In this
case, the wage premium would reflect both values and could not
entirely be attributed to loss of life. For at least some of the research,
a publication bias may have resulted in overestimation. 41 Professor
Sunstein has suggested that the resulting $6.77 million valuation was
"too high" and should be adjusted to around $4.5 million. 42 Given all of
the sources of underestimation, though, it seems more likely that the
valuation is, if anything, too low. The EPA acknowledged in its arsenic
rule that consideration of such unmeasured factors "may significantly
43
increase the present value estimate" for life.
38. See Viscusi, supra note 11, at 442 n.27 (reporting results showing that risk aversion for
loss of life varies at least three fold across a sample of individuals).
39. Economists have begun to analyze this bias as it effects the valuation of life. See, e.g.,
J.F. Shogren & T. Stamland, Skill and the Value of Life, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1168 (2002); Thomas
J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi, Christopher Woock & James P. Ziliak, How Unobservable
Productivity Biases the Value of a Statistical Life (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11659, 2005). The effect of these adjustments varies but all have found that risk
heterogeneity means that the standard wage premium values are biased downward by over one
million dollars.
40. See Raymond, supra note 29, at 73 (noting that life valuation increases "as wealth
increases").
41. See Orley Ashenfelter & Michael Greenstone, Estimating the Value of a StatisticalLife:
The Importance of Omitted Variables and Publication Bias 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper 10401, 2004).
42. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2287-88 (2002).
43. 66 Fed. Reg. 7013 (Jan. 22, 2001).
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One other conservative feature of the regulatory valuations and
underlying studies is their focus on the value of life to the deceased;
they typically do not consider external losses to others. These losses
are, of course, substantial. Anyone who has lost a relative can
appreciate the enormity of emotional loss felt by those who have lost a
loved one, not to mention the possible economic losses that relatives of
the deceased suffer. In the context of administrative regulation,
neglecting to consider such losses is a reasonable approach, because
the United States has a tort compensation system to measure and
require payments for those losses.
The bottom line valuation of life by regulatory agencies varies
but is today typically around $5-$6 million. 44 Professor W. Kip Viscusi,
the leading researcher in the area, has recently found that the social
scientific valuation estimates "are clustered in the $4 million to $10
million range, with an average value of life in the vicinity of $7
million."4 5 These figures capture much of the individual value of life
but may be biased downward by features of the studies on which they
are based. The number might be considered as a lower bound of the
reasonable true economic valuation of life by those at risk.
2. The 9-11 Compensation Commission
After the 9-11 tragedy, Congress enacted legislation to create a
fund and provide compensation for the survivors of those who died in
the attack. 46 The Department of Justice quickly adopted an Interim
Final Rule to guide payments 47 and appointed Kenneth Feinberg as
the Special Master to administer the fund. 48 Under the compensation
44. In the NESHAPs for Hazardous Waste Combustors, the EPA used a VSL of $6.2
million. 70 Fed. Reg. 59,402, 59,533 (Oct. 12, 2005). In Regional Haze Regulations, the EPA
employed a VSL of $5.5 million. 70 Fed. Reg. 39,104, 39,150 (July 6, 2005). The Department of
HHS Standards for Coverage for Organ Procurement Organizations used a VSL of $5 million. 70
Fed. Reg. 6,086, 6,128 (Feb. 4, 2005). The Food and Drug Administration has recommended use
of a default VSL of $5 million in its proposed rule on dietary ingredients and dietary
supplements. 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158, 12,229 (Mar. 13, 2003).
45. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life 5 (Harvard John H. Olin Center for Law, Econ., &
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 517, 2005). This assessment was based on the wage premium studies;
use of consumer safety purchasing data suggests a value of life of about $5 million. Id. at 11.
46. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(c), Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). For the story of the creation and
implementation of the fund, see KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005).

LIFE

WORTH?:

THE

47. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,901 (Nov. 5, 2001)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt 104).
48. For a good review of this process, see Ronald A. Fein & Janet Cooper Alexander,
Appendix: The History and Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 692 (2003).
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system, survivors forego their possible recovery in traditional tort
litigation if they choose the more expeditious option of payments from
the new federal fund. The purposes of the Commission were to provide
for victims and limit litigation, and perhaps also to protect defendants
from potential liability.
The 9-11 Compensation Commission utilized methods that
were very different from those employed in standard executive agency
valuations. Rather than placing ex ante values on statistical lives, the
commission had to put ex post values on particular individual lives in
compensating the survivors. The Special Master was directed to
determine the amount of compensation based on "the harm to the
claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of
the claimant." 49 These vague statutory instructions provided little
guidance to the method of valuation, other than directing that it be
somehow individualized. Compensation was to cover economic and
noneconomic losses, and the latter category was to include "losses for
physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life,
loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss
of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all
other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature. ' 50 The very general
directions only made clear that noneconomic losses should be defined
very broadly.
The Special Master gave flesh to these statutory directions and
created an income-based grid for calculating economic losses but
permitted appropriate departures from the grid. While economic loss
was defined broadly, its scope was confined by the statutory reference
to "applicable State law," 51 a phrase interpreted with reference to tort
law. Noneconomic loss was not necessarily so limited; rather than
seeking to fully calculate such losses for each individual, the Special
Master initially set by regulation a minimum payout of $500,000 for
deceased victims with dependents and $300,000 for deceased victims
who were single with no dependents, but later reduced the amount to
presumed noneconomic losses of $250,000.52 He explained this decision
as follows: "I solved this problem. I told everybody in the program
everybody gets $250,000 for the death of the victim and $100,000 for
each surviving souse and dependent. That's it. That's the rule. I'm not
Solomon, and I'm not making distinctions based on noneconomic

49.
50.
51.
52.

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 402(7).
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 402(5).
28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2006).
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loss." 53 While this compromise may be understandable under the
circumstances, it is a considerable departure from tort standards and
reflects an administrative decision.
After facing political backlash about disparate compensation
for the rich, the Special Master did not attempt to compensate fully
victims for economic loss under the governing tort law standards. 54 A
two-track system was created, in which beneficiaries could either
accept the presumed compensation calculation or demand a hearing to
account for extraordinary circumstances warranting a departure from
the presumptive award. 55 The Compensation Commission procedure
yielded a court challenge, brought by survivors of those with high
incomes who argued that the system undercompensated them. The
challengers argued that the system departed from state law in
calculating economic losses (for example, by using after-tax income)
and failed to provide for the individualized calculation of economic
damages, as in litigation. The court rejected the challenge, granting
deference to the Commission and finding that Congress did not
require "the Special Master to engage in the intricate calculations
56
mandated by state tort law in crafting awards."
Eventually, nearly 3000 families, representing about 97% of
those eligible, obtained fund compensation
that averaged
approximately $2.1 million per applicant. 5 7 The payments ranged from
$250,000 to over $7 million. 58 Individual features of the victims, such
as age and gender, were factors in payment amounts. Those under
twenty-five received on average about $1.6 million. 5 9 Women between
thirty-one and forty received slightly more ($1.68 million) but men in
60
that age range received nearly $2.8 million in average payment.
Those between sixty-one and seventy who died in the attack received
average compensation of less than $1 million. 61 Income of the deceased

53. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master, September l1th Victim Compensation Fund,
Address at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 17, 2005). For
additional explanation, see FEINBERG, supra note 46, at 75-77.
54. See Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective
Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 151 (2005).

55.
56.
57.

28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b) (2006).
Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
David W. Chen, After Weighing Value of Lives, 9/11 Fund Completes Its Task, N.Y.

TIMES, June 16, 2004, at Al.

58. Id. The highest award actually went to a woman who survived, with severe burns, and
received $8.6 million. Feinberg Address, supra note 53.
59. FEINBERG, supranote 46, at 195 (using date in Appendix for calculation).
60.

Id.

61.

Id.
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was a significant factor in the amount of individual compensation as
62
well.
The general "value of life" provided as compensation by the 911 Commission was considerably less than that proposed by
regulatory agencies for VSL purposes. This might be considered
surprising because the "average income of the September 11 victims"
was much higher than that of the general population. 63 The lower
value may have been due to a desire to conserve government
resources 64 or to the Compensation Commission's partial use of tort
standards to value lost life, standards discussed in the following
section.
B. Common Law Courts and Wrongful Death
The valuation of life in the tort compensation system is
somewhat more complicated. The central focus of the tort system is to
provide compensation to the living, not to value the life of the
deceased. The societal value of the tort compensation system,
however, is to deter potential tortfeasors from engaging in risky
behavior that could result in the loss of life. 65 An efficient deterrence
system would not ignore the losses of the deceased. While tort awards
are ex post after someone has died, 66 the societal significance of the
valuation of life is ex ante, giving potential defendants the optimal
financial incentive to prevent causing the loss of life.
The tort compensation system is state-based and consequently
not uniform. Some states have wrongful death provisions that
compensate survivors for the value of the lost benefits they would
have received from the decedent. Other states have somewhat
different survival statutes that allow the decedent's own claims of
harm to survive his or her death, though these often measure
damages similarly in the amount of economic income foregone. Some

62. See id. at 194 (providing a breakdown of payments by income level).
63. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 553.
64. The Special Master expressed concern "about an open-ended run on the U.S. Treasury."
FEINBERG, supra note 46, at 42.
65. See infra Part I.C.
66. Some cases allow a still living plaintiff to recover for an enhanced risk of loss of life
imposed by a defendant, but these cases are not common and not the subject of this study. See
generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of an increased risk of harm to the
doctrine of corrective justice).
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states have provisions for both types of action. Texas law provides
67
both authorities for recovery.
The various state rules for compensating lost life in tort share
many features in common. While the empirical analysis of
compensation in this article is limited to Texas, we also review the
more general and common features of the law. Given the amount of
litigation on damages valuation, this section also must be quite
abbreviated. Recovery in death cases can take two forms - damages
suffered by survivors from the loss of life of the deceased and damages
suffered by the deceased (e.g., pain and suffering before death) that
can be paid to the deceased's estate.
The foundational measure of lost life in the tort system is
economic damages. This is a rough measure of the future income of
the deceased that is lost to the survivors, sometimes called "loss of
support." It requires a calculation of the deceased's expected earnings
for the remainder of his or her life, minus expenditures for the benefit
of the deceased, discounted for time. 68 These damages are based
centrally on the earning capacity of the deceased. Other forms of
economic damages may sometimes be recovered, such as medical care
costs before death or funeral expenses. Many states allow some
recovery for the economic value of non-market services provided by the
deceased (such as household care). In general, though, damages are
proportional to lost income, and the unemployed (including children
and the elderly) can receive little in economic damages. 69
States typically also provide recovery for noneconomic
damages. The basic concept of such damages is "to make the plaintiff
whole," compensating him or her for any losses suffered. The very
concept of making the plaintiff whole, though, is difficult to apply in
cases of death. Courts of the various states recognize sundry theories
of noneconomic damages. One is damages for loss of society or
consortium of the deceased, usually recoverable by a spouse or

67. The Texas survival statute is found at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021(a)
(Vernon 2005). The wrongful death statute is located at § 71.002(b).
68.

See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 406-07 (1999).

69. See, e.g., Michael Oakes Finkelstein et al., The Death of Children: A Nonparametric
Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 884 (1974) (arguing that
deaths of children are undercompensated by tort system); Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A
Story about Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2005)

(observing that under the literal economic damages rule children "have a negative net worth
because child-rearing costs exceed the value of monetary and service contributions that children
make" and the "lives of elderly people similarly have little value because they have used up most
of their economic productivity").
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children. 70 States also allow some recovery for services, such as
household maintenance, that are not marketed. 71 Recovery is
commonly allowed for the conscious pain and suffering of the deceased
prior to death. Some states allow recovery for the estimated economic
loss from the grief suffered by survivors. As a general rule, juries are
given very little guidance about the proper calculation of such
damages.72

Theoretically, one might expect hedonic damages (meant to
measure the value of life itself to a person) and the empirical studies
on the value of life to be considered as noneconomic damages in death
cases. In practice, however, courts have generally rejected evidence on
such a measure of damages, at least in wrongful death cases.7 3 Some
states have allowed evidence on such hedonic damages, though, and a
recent article detected a trend in their favor. 74 Texas has allowed such
damages in non-death cases for loss of quality of life. 75 Most states still
do not recognize this measure, which raises some serious evidentiary
questions, 76 but the availability of such damages could considerably
alter the total amount of damages available.
The measure of all forms of noneconomic damages is quite
imprecise and accordingly leaves plenty of "play in the joints." The
noneconomic losses in tort law "are imprecisely defined" with "very
little constructive guidance" to judges and juries, and hence are
70. These awards are potentially quite substantial. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Mica Corp., 107
S.W.3d 13, 35 (Tex. App. 2002) (upholding $7 million award for loss of consortium to children
after parents' were killed). But they are not necessarily so substantial. See, e.g., Diamond
Offshore Mgmt. Co. v. Guidry, 84 S.W.2d 256, 262 (Tex. App. 2002) (awarding $400,000 in such
damages to child who lost parent).
71. See Thomas R. Ireland, Compensable Nonmarket Services in Wrongful Death Litigation:
Legal Definitions and Measurement Standards, J. LEGAL ECON., Fall 1997, at 15 (discussing
generally the availability of such damages).
72. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-SufferingDamages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a PreliminaryProposal for a Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 90 (2006)
(noting that juries receive only "vague instructions" on this calculation).
73. See Joseph A. Kupier, The Courts, Daubert and Willingness-To-Pay: The Doubtful
Futureof Hedonic Damages Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
1197, 1199 (1996) ("Most states have allowed damages for the loss of enjoyment of life in
personal injury cases, and a minority of states have even allowed such damages in cases of
wrongful death."); Reuben E. Slesinger, The Demise of Hedonic Damages Claims in Tort
Litigation,J. LEGAL ECON., Fall 1996, at 17 (discussing decline in use).
74. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling
Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2004) (reporting that a "growing minority of state
courts are gradually expanding the availability of hedonic damages").
75. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003).
76. See Kuiper, supra note 73, at 1254 (arguing that the measures for such damages will
not satisfy the federal standard for admissible evidence); Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 74,
at 1037-38 (suggesting that expert testimony on the issue was scientifically unsound and
inadmissible).
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"tremendously variable in practice." 77 One might guess that juries are
adjusting their noneconomic damages awards to account for hedonic
considerations. One study evaluated noneconomic awards in cases
involving physical injuries and sought to extrapolate a value of life.7 8
The study examined jury awards and found an implied life valuation
between $1.9 million and $3.8 million in these cases, with
79
considerable variance by cause of harm.
There is some anecdotal evidence from reported cases in Texas
that juries sometimes make this adjustment for hedonic damages.
When a boy was trapped underneath a garage door and conscious for
no more than a few hours, the court upheld an award of $1 million for
pain and suffering.8 0 In a series of recent Texas cases involving deaths
for which nursing homes were liable, juries assessed, and courts
upheld, noneconomic damages ranging from $75,00081 to around
$400,00082 to $3,000,00083 for relatively brief periods of suffering. The
cases suggest that while noneconomic damages may sometimes
provide material compensation, the results seem somewhat arbitrary.
There is little evidence that the tort compensation system
addresses concepts such as QALYs or other theoretical adjustments
for loss of life of the young who may lack traditional economic
damages. In one Texas decision, a fourteen year old died as a result of
auto injuries.8 4 The court found no economic damages but awarded the
surviving parents $102,500 for their mental anguish. The
noneconomic damages here came far short of compensating for the
hedonic loss of life of the youth. Courts generally provide less
compensation for the young who are not yet employed.

77. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Brian Raymond, Patient Safety, Just Compensation and Medical
Liability Reform, IssuE BRIEF (Kaiser Permanente Inst. for Health, Oakland, Cal.), Summer
2003, at 2, availableat http://www.kpihp.org/publications/docs/safety-brief.pdf.
78. See Mark A. Cohen & Ted R. Miller, 'Willingness to Award" Nonmonetary Damages and
the Implied Value of Life from Jury Awards, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 165, 170-71 (2003) (using

proportional life impairment scales developed for medical care and examining awards for such
impairments as measures for the loss of a full life).
79. See id. at 179.
80. Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 970 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1992).
81. HCRA of Tex., Inc. v. Johnston, 178 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App. 2005) (upholding this sum
for pain and suffering prior to death involving malnourishment and back ulcers oozing blood).
82. SunBridge Healthcare Corp. v. Penny, 160 S.W.3d 230, 252-53 (Tex. App. 2005)
(reducing jury award of nearly $500,000 to approximately $400,000 where patient suffered facial
disfigurement but for only four days prior to death).
83. CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Pybas, 127 S.W. 3d 400, 414 (Tex. App. 2004)
(upholding this sum when plaintiff suffered six days of pain and anguish from lack of oxygen
supply), withdrawn per settlement, No. 05-03-00517, 2004 WL 585008 (Tex. App. Mar. 25, 2004).
84. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
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Finally, the tort system provides for awards of exemplary or
punitive damages. These damages, though, are based on the
defendant's conduct rather than the plaintiffs actual losses. The
Restatement provides that punitive damages "may be awarded for
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or
his reckless indifference to the rights of others."85 These damages may
supplement the damages available for economic and noneconomic
losses in death cases, 86 though punitives are unavailable for merely
negligent behavior. Amounts provided in settlement may be affected
by the threat of a punitive damages award. The threshold showing
necessary for punitive damages in Texas is a high one, though, so they
87
are not generally available to compensate for causing death.
Some evidence regarding death compensation in tort actions is
available. A study of airline accident crash victims found that the
system undercompensated for large economic losses.8 8 There is some
limited data existing on the value of life assigned in tort litigation. A
Civil Justice System ("CJS") dataset reports the awards in death cases
from trials in the seventy-five largest counties of the United States
during the year 2001.89 In these cases, the median award was
$961,000, while the mean award was around $3.75 million for the 162
cases in which the plaintiff prevailed. 90 Judge Posner and Professor
Sunstein also report some results for the value of life in tort litigation.
In an "unscientific" data set from Lexis, they find that the mean
award for loss of life was $3.1 million, and the median award was $1.1
million. 91 There was considerable variance in the amount awarded,
with some very high awards driving up the mean.
The figures arrived at by Judge Posner and Professor Sunstein
may not truly represent the value of life in tort litigation for several

85.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1978).

86. See Ofczarak v. Emeritus Corp., No. 2003 C1 13504 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2005),
withdrawn per settlement, No. 04-05-00530-CV, 2006 WL 923534 (Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2006).
87. Although the threshold finding warranting punitive damages has a substantial factual
component that demands appellate deference, the Texas Supreme Court has in two recent
wrongful death cases reversed punitive damages awards, finding that the threshold was not in
fact satisfied. See Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 165-66 (Tex. 2005); Sw.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. 2005).
88.

JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT

LITIGATION 86-95 (1988).
89. See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001

10 (2004).
90. See id. Some additional data come from the Jury Verdict and Settlement data that are
reported on Lexis. For these cases, the median award for loss of life was $1.1 million and the
mean award around $3.1 million. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 548.
91. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 548.
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reasons. For example, the numbers may have been reduced by various
defenses, such as the plaintiffs comparative negligence. Thus, it is
possible that the jury assigned a value to life of $2 million, found the
plaintiff 50% responsible for the death, and awarded $1 million in
damages. In this case, the actual trial awards would understate the
true value of life in the tort system. In addition, the results may
systematically overstate the valuation of life because they report trial
court verdicts. If these cases are appealed, the award may
subsequently be reduced, or the plaintiff may settle the appeal for less
than the verdict. Such reductions are common. 92 When they occur,
they reduce the amount awarded for loss of life. Moreover, the
databases used were not comprehensive and may not be
representative of actual payments received. One other report that
considered trial outcomes and settlements found an average payment
for loss of life of only $219,237 (in 1985 dollars), far less than the trial
93
payments reported by Judge Posner and Professor Sunstein.
Yet another complication in the tort system valuation of life
involves the payment of attorneys. Such cases are usually brought on
a contingency fee basis, and plaintiffs' attorneys typically receive
around a third of the ultimate fee award as compensation for their
services. 94 These transaction costs are associated with the societal
value of screening justifiable claims from the unjustifiable ones. 95
They do not provide compensation for loss of life, however, and don't
reflect the value of life. 96 The latter two considerations suggest that
the Posner and Sunstein figures significantly overestimate the
valuation of life in the tort liability system.
The Posner and Sunstein figures also overemphasize trial
awards and not settlements. It should generally be the economically
efficient action to settle a claim and thereby avoid litigation costs. In
practice, the vast majority of tort cases settle. Data suggest that

92. See, e.g., Ivy E. Broder, Characteristicsof Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and
Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 349, 353 (1986) (reporting that successful plaintiffs
received on average only 57% of the amount awarded at trial).
93. W. Kip Viscusi, Liability for Occupational Accidents and Illnesses, in LIABILITY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 155, 173 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds. 1988).
94.

See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 39-43 (2004)

(reporting results study of Wisconsin practitioners that one-third contingency fee was most
common among plaintiffs' lawyers but that adjustments were sometimes made).
95. See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2112-13
(2002) (discussing screening function of civil justice system).
96. The contrast is evident in the fact that the administrative transaction costs of the
regulatory system in computing the value of life are not incorporated into the regulatory
estimates of this value.
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settlements resolve about 95% of all filed actions. 9 7 There is no reason
to think that the tried cases represent a random sample of either
disputes or damages paid per plaintiff, thus the trial outcomes offer a
poor measure for compensation in the tort system. The American tort
system's true measure of compensation for lost life must thus be
derived from examination of settlements, not trial awards.
Compensation in the tort liability system rarely results from a jury's
decision at trial, as the vast majority of cases are settled before such a
decision is reached.
This result might suggest that we pay far too much attention to
the standards of the law, of evidence, and of other trial procedures, as
trials dictate a miniscule number of compensation awards. However,
the small number of cases that go to trial may indirectly control the
compensation in all other cases, including those in which a lawsuit
was not even filed. Settlement is said to be "in the shadow of the
law."98 When an insurer decides to settle a claim, it is not
philanthropic but an attempt to ascertain the amount the insurer is
legally obligated to pay under its policy, as a basis for negotiating a
settlement. Consequently, the amount of settlement should be related
to the expected consequences if the claim actually proceeded to a
formal legal outcome. The effect is an indirect derivative one, though,
that is surely mitigated by a variety of features, such as bargaining
position, information asymmetries, and readily available resources
(e.g., insurance coverage) for payments to claimants. To truly
understand the reality of compensation in the tort system, one must
examine settlements.
A substantial body of legal and economic research addresses
the settlement of claims in the shadow of the law. The foundation of
such research is commonly known as the "Priest-Klein hypothesis." 99
Bringing a case to trial may involve considerable litigation costs,
97.

Information from state courts shows that about 96% of civil cases are concluded without

trial. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS, 1999-2000: A NATIONAL PERSEPCTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 29

(2000). Data from the federal courts report that about 98% of civil cases are resolved without
trial. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2001); see also Robert D.

Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LITERATURE. 1067, 1070 (1989) (reporting that a "typical finding is that ten disputes settle
out of court for every one that is tried"); Silver, supra note 95, at 2112 (estimating from the data
that "trials occur in about 3% of all litigated cases").
98. Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 565 (1992)
(quoting Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).
99. This theoretical assessment of tried versus settled claims was propounded in George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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including the payment of attorneys, expert witness fees, and time.10 0
Consequently, the parties have an economic incentive to settle when
possible. The Priest-Klein hypothesis suggests that the "easy" cases
(those where either a plaintiff or defendant victory is highly probable)
will settle because their outcome is relatively predictable. The cases
that go to trial are the "close" cases in which the trial outcome is
highly uncertain.1 0 1
The Priest-Klein hypothesis, in its simplest iteration, is not a
precise determinant of when settlement will occur. The authors'
prediction, that trial outcomes should be roughly 50% for plaintiff and
50% for defendant, has been empirically tested and only partially
confirmed.' 02 The predictive inaccuracies of the hypothesis do not
undermine the basic validity of the model, however. When plaintiffs
win a preponderance of cases, as in some areas of the law, this is
easily explained by the fact that the "close" legal issue is not one of
liability but one of recoverable damages. The preponderance of
defendant victories in other areas of the law may be explained by
asymmetries of information about the quality of the lawsuit 103 or
asymmetries of interest in the outcome (e.g., the value of creating a
precedent to control similar future litigation). 10 4 Once adjusted for

100. Attorneys for plaintiffs operating on contingent fees have a considerable incentive to
settle cases, because this minimizes the time and effort required to obtain a fee and enables
them to take on more cases and receive more fees. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers
in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.J. 523, 544-45 (1996) (discussing this
incentive and citing supporting literature).
101. See Priest & Klein, supra note 99, at 13-16.
102. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
TranscendingEmpiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1137 tbl. 3 (1992) (summarizing types of
cases where plaintiff win rates diverge from 50%); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations
from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 233, 238-41 (1996) (same).
103. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1995) (discussing significance of asymmetric information in the parties' decision between
settling and proceeding to trial); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 205 (1993) (describing how asymmetric
information affects outcomes, generally to the benefit of defendants in tort litigation).
104. For a discussion of how such strategic litigation influences the selection of cases for trial
and outcomes, see Frank B. Cross, In Praiseof IrrationalPlaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5-15
(2000) and research cited therein describing theory and evidence supporting notion that
defendants selectively settle and try cases to produce precedents. See also Gary M. Fournier &
Thomas W. Zuehlke, The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements, 27 RAND J. ECON. 310, 317 tbl.3
(1996) (empirically demonstrating the significance of asymmetric stakes); Joel Waldfogel, The
Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and PlaintiffVictory, 103 J. POL. ECON.
229, 253-54 (1995) (demonstrating that asymmetric stakes explain a very low plaintiff win rate
in tort litigation).
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these additional considerations, the data provide at least rough
support for the Priest-Klein hypothesis.105
The hypothesis does not tell us the precise nature of the claims
that settle but suggests that they include both very weak and very
strong claims. The adjustments to the hypothesis that evolved out of
the empirical findings suggest that very strong claims are relatively
more likely to settle than very weak ones. If the population of claims
reflected a normal distribution, the mean strength of the settled case
would be a moderately strong one, with perhaps a 50% chance of
success (though cases at this precise point would tend to be tried).
Because of asymmetric information and stakes (both of which
empirically tend to favor defendants), the settled cases are probably a
little stronger than the true median case.
This theoretical conclusion probably somewhat understates the
strength of the settled claims. Plaintiffs' lawyers tend to screen out
the weakest cases as not worth their time. 10 6 In addition, available
research suggests that Americans are not as litigious as they are
commonly proclaimed to be. 10 7 The issue has been most closely
researched in the context of malpractice claims, which yields the
following findings:
[Tihe California study showed that there were ten serious injuries from medical
malpractice for every medical malpractice lawsuit filed in the 1970s. The Harvard
research showed that there were at least seven serious injuries from medical
malpractice for every medical malpractice lawsuit filed in New York in the late 1980s
and at least six serious injuries from medical malpractice for every medical malpractice
lawsuit filed in Utah and Colorado in the early 1990s.... [T]he Harvard researchers
and the Chicago researchers each found that only one out of every twenty-five patients
10 8
with a negligent or preventable medical injury brought a medical malpractice claim.

The studies do not suggest that Americans injured by tortious
behavior rush to bring weak claims; they do not even bring many
strong claims. The national "pattern is one of under-claiming, not
105. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment
Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects To Test the Priest-Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995) (providing support for the Priest-Klein hypothesis with
the condition that parties with greater stakes in the outcome tended to win a higher percentage
of cases).
106. See KRITZER, supra note 94, at 71-74, 84 (studying this selectivity and noting that
lawyers decline cases most often because the facts do not appear to support liability).
107. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What
Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1982 fig. 1 (2002) (reporting
data showing that litigation rate in United States is well below that of other developed countries,
such as Germany); Richard A. Posner, Explaining the Variance in the Number of Tort Suits
Across U.S. States and Between the United States and England, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 487-88
(1997) (concluding that after controlling for variables such as income, education, and
urbanization, English citizens appear to file more tort suits than Americans).
108. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 37 (2005).
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over-claiming." 10 9 Moreover,
contingency-fee plaintiffs lawyers
typically reject claims where the case is especially weak on the
merits. 110 It is impossible to assess the legal validity of the settled
cases in the sample, but there is ample reason to believe that they are
not systematically weak.
C. Reconciling Administrative and Litigation Value
We currently operate under both administrative regulation
that values statistical lives and tort litigation that provides
compensation for the loss of life. The two systems are not exclusive or
discrete. Although both operate concurrently, it would be inaccurate to
sum the valuation of the two systems for a value of life. The
administrative value of life used in regulation-setting covers only a
very small slice of life risks. For most risks in life, only the tort
compensation system is relevant.
Judge Posner and Professor Sunstein view the administrative
and litigation systems as complementary systems of risk regulation to
be coordinated.'
If the tort system worked perfectly, there would
arguably be no need for regulation, as liability would send the proper
deterrence signal to potential defendants. The overall liability system
falls far short of serving this role, however. Many of those harmed by
torts do not even sue. When a lawsuit is filed, it may fail, even when
deserving, for a variety of reasons, such as an inability to prove true
causation. Deaths from disease, such as cancer, have multiple possible
causes and may not be traceable to the responsible party.1 12 Tort law
cannot effectively promote the optimal level of safety by itself, but it
remains a vital cog in the American legal system's protections. For
informational reasons, tort law may be more effective than the
regulatory system at protecting public health and safety.' 13 Thus, the
accurate valuation of life in one legal sphere does not supplant the
need for accurate valuation in others.

109. Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort
Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1096 (2000).
110. See Herbert Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH U.
L.Q. 739, 753 (2002) (discussing reason for declining representation).
111. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 563.
112. Id. (giving the example of air pollution, where "chains of causation are exceedingly
difficult to trace, and those who fall prey to life-threatening or fatal diseases are unlikely to know
that pollution is responsible").
113. See Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston, Policy Opinions, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES
AND POLICY, supra note 93, at 223, 240 (noting that the "virtue of tort law is that it provides a
decentralized mechanism for determining the hazards in substances, product designs or behavior
that in many situations may be superior to relying on centralized government regulation").
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One might argue that full tort compensation for loss of life
could involve duplicative recoveries, at least for those workers who
have first received a wage premium for accepting the risk of death and
then full compensation for deaths that occur. 114 However, the wage
premium bargains are with employers, who are typically covered by
the worker compensation system, not the tort system. The tort system,
therefore, does not implicate wage premium bargains. Moreover, there
is no such risk of double compensation for victims who are not able to
bargain for wage premiums as workers (such as victims of
malpractice).
The regulatory and tort compensation systems are duplicative
structures, both aimed in part at the protection of life through
proscription or deterrence of risky activities. For either structure to
function best, it must have an appropriate valuation of life in order to
ascertain when proscription or deterrence is appropriate. The
regulatory system has settled on a valuation of roughly $6 million,
grounded in considerable social scientific research. The following
section analyzes the valuation of life in the Texas tort system.
II. THE TEXAS CLOSED CLAIM DATABASE
The Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI") maintains a large
115
Texas Closed Claim Database ("TCCD") of insurance payments.
This data has been described in detail in an existing article that
addresses malpractice litigation. 116 This section contains an
abbreviated discussion of the data and its limits.
A. DataDescription
TDI requires commercial liability insurers to report all closed
claims involving bodily injury, reports that are cumulated in the
TCCD. The TCCD currently includes claims that closed from 1988 to
2003. The reporting format has changed little over time. Some
concerns about under-reporting in 1988 and 1989 led TDI to begin
auditing the TCCD in 1990. Reports for subsequent years are thought
114. This risk of double compensation may be self-correcting in the labor market. The
greater the ex post compensation, the less ex ante compensation would be provided. The selfcorrection will be imperfect, though, because the individual workers who suffer deaths will not
personally receive the ex post payments, which go to their survivors, so they might continue to
bargain for the wage premiums.
115. See Tex. Dep't of Ins., Prop. and Cas. Div., Data Services, TEXAS CLOSED CLAIM
REPORTING GUIDE (2002).
116. See Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005).
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to be complete. While reports for 1988 and 1989 may be incomplete,
they should nonetheless be unbiased. TDI also identifies duplicative
117
reports relating to the same claim.
The TCCD contains claims that fall within five lines of
commercial insurance
coverage:
mono-line
general
liability,
commercial auto liability, Texas commercial multiperil, medical
professional liability, and other professional liability. It does not
include claims covered by personal lines of insurance, such as personal
automobile or homeowner's policies. It also excludes workers'
compensation payments. Even within the category of commercially
insured claims, it excludes certain categories of payments, and it also
excludes class action claims and mass torts.
The TCCD contains three types of reports: brief aggregate
reports of claims with payments of $10,000 or less, moderately
detailed individual reports of claims with payments between $10,001
and $24,999, and extensive reports on claims with payments of
$25,000 and up (all dollar values nominal). Only the extensive reports
of the latter group require insurers to indicate whether death was the
injury compensated. Consequently, we focus on these claims.
TDI does not adjust the reporting thresholds for inflation,
which creates a "bracket creep" phenomenon. That is, as inflation
drives up the value of claims over time, the coverage of the $25,000
and up group naturally increases. We address this problem by
adjusting for inflation, using the Consumer Price Index, and excluding
claims with total payouts below $25,000 in 1988 dollars.
B. Limitations
The TCCD is not a complete sample of all tort claims in Texas.
It excludes claims that are covered by excluded lines of insurance and
claims against uninsured defendants. The TCCD is also not a random
sample of the larger tort universe, so caution is required before using
it to generalize about all claims in Texas or in other states. The TCCD
is still useful, though, because it is very large and because reporting is
mandatory. It directly measures the amounts paid in over ten
thousand death cases and is free of biases that can be introduced
when researchers select a group of claims.
As noted above, the nature of the plaintiffs injury is reported
only when payments exceed $25,000. Death cases should generally
yield awards larger than this amount, so we presume this is not a

117. We have supplemented TDI's auditing process by identifying some additional duplicate
reports.
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significant limitation. Conceivably, some number of death cases might
have been resolved for smaller amounts and therefore been excluded
from our data. Insurers file reports only when they make payments, so
the TCCD does not include zero payment results, such as could occur
when the defendant prevails at trial. We presume that these cases
were resolved in the defendants' favor on liability issues, so the
importance of this limitation for measuring the value of life as
damages is small.
III. VALUATION OF LIFE IN TEXAS LITIGATION

In this Section, we review the data on the functioning of the
tort compensation system in Texas and the amount received by
plaintiffs in death cases. This enables us to analyze some of the
general presumptions about trial, settlement and damages. We then
review the awards to plaintiffs in death cases. The latter analysis
includes summary statistics to see how those awards conform to the
estimated value of life set out in the preceding section. We are also
able to consider whether a few variables used in the preceding quality
of life analysis truly affect the awards given for death in Texas.
A. Descriptive Statistics
We begin by. reporting some general information from the
TCCD, such as summary statistics on the amount paid out under
different circumstances, the stage at which compensation was paid,
and whether there was any trend in the magnitude of such payments
over time (in real dollars). Table 1 reports the number of total claims
for all injuries, average payments, and standard deviation of payment
for the entire database, in 1988 dollars, with duplicates excluded.

2006]

1901

IN TEXAS, LIFE IS CHEAP

Table 1
Summary Statistics on TCCD Payouts
StandardDeviation
Mean
Number Median
Total Claims
Claims > $25,000
Death Claims

165,215
74,349
11,502

$26,168
$72,161
$199,586

$135,628
$215,924
$413,153

$522,409
$572,119
$728,144

Several findings are evident. First, payments in death cases
are much larger than individually-reported payments in general. The
mean death payment is three times the size of the average payment
for all individually reported claims and almost twice the size of the
average for all claims with payments above $25,000 (in 1988 dollars).
The median death payment is more than seven times the general
median and almost three times as high as the median for claims with
payments exceeding $25,000. Presumably, these differences are due to
the presence of many claims involving much less severe injuries.
Second, payouts in death claims are quite low compared to the VSL
estimates and the 9-11 Compensation Commission payments. The
median is less than ten percent of the Compensation Commission
payments and less than five percent of the VSL estimates. Third, the
standard deviation in mean payments in all categories indicates
significant variation. This is logical for claims in general, given the
diversity of potential injuries and the cost of dealing with them. This
variation could also be attributed to the highly individualized
damages measure employed by the tort compensation system (though
it might also be due to certain irrational features of the system
analyzed below).
We next review the stage of the proceedings at which the
plaintiff received compensation. The data enable us to isolate the
number of cases in which a lawsuit was filed by plaintiffs in death
cases, and the stage at which the insurance company provided
compensation to the plaintiffs. We can ascertain the percentage of
cases that proceed to a final trial and appeal before compensation is
paid. Table 2 sets forth the number of cases in which compensation
was paid at various stages coded by the closed claim database.
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Table 2
Stage at Which Compensation Was Paid
Number of cases
ADR/No Lawsuit
219
No Lawsuit
1047
ADR/Lawsuit
2950
Lawsuit/Settled Before Trial 7826
Lawsuit/Settled During Trial 309
Court Verdict
48
Settlement After Verdict
151
Settlement After Appeal
112
These results give considerable information about the
compensation system for death cases in Texas. In about 90% of death
closed claim cases in the state, a lawsuit was filed, though 99% of the
reported claims were resolved before a trial and verdict. This number
is imprecise, as a number of defense victories are excluded from the
data because they involved no payout. The Texas tort system plainly
relies overwhelmingly on settlements for providing compensation in
death cases.
Our next set of summary data examines any time trends in the
payout in Texas death cases. One frequently hears that payments on
tort claims have risen substantially and that these alleged increases
have been driven by forces including jury verdicts, plaintiffs'
attorneys, and medical costs. In response, tort reform advocates have
been working to reduce payments, mounting public campaigns,
funding candidates in judicial elections, and obtaining favorable
legislation.
In principle, payments on tort claims, including death claims,
may have risen, fallen, or remained the same. A prior study using the
TCCD found that real payments in medical malpractice claims have
changed little over time, 118 and we expect death payments to show no
significant time trend. Figure 1 shows this to be the case. When
adjusted only for general inflation, mean and median payments on
death claims were highly stable from 1988 to 2003. We confirmed the
absence of a time trend by regressing the real payment against the
year, and there was no statistically significant change over time.

118. See Black et al., supra note 116, at 238-39.
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Figure 1
Payouts over Time
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From this finding, we can conclude that we need no time-based
variable when evaluating the factors associated with payments in
death cases.
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B. Factors Influencing Valuation of Life
This section identifies several plausible determinants of
payments in death cases, discusses their theoretical significance for
valuation of lost life, and provides basic summary statistics for each.
As part of our analysis, we present the results of a simple single-factor
regression on payment amount. The distribution of payments in the
TCCD is somewhat skewed; it is clustered toward lower amounts with
a long right tail of higher payments. Consequently, we use a log scale
for payment amount in the regressions in order to yield a more normal
regression pattern. Our analysis concludes with a capstone multiple
regression that considers all the determinants for effect on the log of
real payment size.
1. Age and Employment
There is considerable theoretical literature on the effect of the
deceased's age on the appropriate damages award, as discussed above
in Section I. In general, the theoreticians suggest that death at an
earlier age should yield greater damages, in roughly descending
proportion to age, though some suggest that age should not be a factor.
Doctrines of tort damages, at least economic damages, suggest a
different outcome. Under these doctrines, one would expect relatively
low awards for minors and increasing awards as a person reaches his
or her peak earnings, after which such damages awards might be
expected to decline with superannuation. Under "value of life"
theories, one should see a relatively linear relationship declining with
age. In contrast, tort doctrine suggests that the relationship would
appear to be a quadratic one. In this section, we examine whether
either of these theories holds up in actual compensation in Texas.
The TCCD data enable the compilation of summary data on
claims by age as well as payments in those claims. Table 3 presents
this data with the number of claims by decade (though we use 0-20 for
the young and 80+ for the superannuated), with mean, median, and
standard deviation of payments.
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Table 3

0-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
80+

Death Claims by Age Group
Number Median
Mean
StandardDeviation
$618,182
$172,445 $345,011
2306
1797
$225,000 $459,201
$758,528
1868
$263,894 $560,352
$961,620
1530
$255,435 $514,167
$907,393
1327
$192,880 $388,588
$633,437
1095
$181,442 $296,780
$366,965
914
$147,608 $290,633
$538,675
665
$139,693 $288,159
$464,957

The results support the legal hypothesis that payments to
children, who are not yet employable, would be lower and grow with
age and possible employment, as the courts can calculate greater
future income losses for victims. Then, as expected, the sums peak and
decline as workers reach an age at which their expected future income
is less. If the basic legal tort rules are operating, we would expect an
inverse U-shaped quadratic relationship for damages, as discussed
above in section I. Figure 2 graphically displays the median amount of
damages paid in death cases by decade of life, with the best available
smoothed curve and the surrounding 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2
Total Compensation in Settlements by Decade of Life
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Thus, the basic relationship is the quadratic one that might be
expected from tort compensation rules. The settlement amounts by
age increase until they peak at around forty, after which they
dramatically decline. While these results are a much better fit for the
tort legal pattern than the theoretical economic pattern, the
magnitude of the effect is not as great as one might expect under the
tort legal pattern. Settlement compensation for those at the peak of
their earning potential is only about 50% greater than compensation
for those who are minors. This size might be attributable to the
predominance of noneconomic damages. Seniors obviously receive
lower awards. In summary, age appears to be a determinant of
payments in settled death cases along a pattern that fits the tort law
damage standards including economic losses.
One of the variables reported in the closed claim database is
the plaintiffs employment status. This is reported only as a binary
variable, so valuable information about the nature of the employment
or the amount of compensation is not available. Nevertheless,
employment status alone should have some impact on the amounts
awarded under both the economic theory and the tort rules for
compensation. Employed victims would be expected to have greater
economic damages, perhaps substantially greater.
To consider this effect, we provide summary statistics for death
claims by working status overall. Table 4 breaks down the claims for
employment status, by all claims, as well as for non-work-related
claims, with average payouts and standard deviations in constant
dollars.
Table 4
Death Claims by Employment
Victim Employed
Victim Unemployed
Employed & Work-Related
Employed & Not Work-Related

Number

Median

Mean

StandardDeviation

5345
6157
1883
3462

$254,018
$166,996
$293,683
$233,795

$512,917
$326,547
$589,709
$471,149

$864,105
$571,145
$985,939
$787.004

As anticipated, employed individuals in Texas death cases
receive materially larger settlement payments than those who are not
employed. This is fits the predictions of the legal model for economic
damages, which posits that compensation should be greater for
employed individuals. Even after considering employment status,
however,
work-related
injuries
appear
to
receive
greater
compensation. There is no obvious legal reason for this finding, though
some features of work-related deaths might conceivably be associated
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with higher levels of noneconomic damages or perhaps a greater
threat of punitive damages being incorporated into the settlement
amount.
One additional variable is whether the claim itself was workrelated (as distinguished from the employment status of the claimant),
as the TCCD separates out work-related claims from those unrelated
to the work place. Figure 3 displays the mean payments in these
claims (in real dollars) for death damages over time.
Figure 3
Work Related Death Payouts
Average Paymients: Work-Related Deaths vs. Other Deaths
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Work-related claims vary more over time but consistently
result in higher payments compared to other types of claims. This
finding may not be intrinsic to the workplace, but instead simply may
be due to the fact that those who died in work-related claims were
employed, while a number of the other claimants were not, thus
yielding higher economic damages.1 1 9

119. Alternatively, the results might be due to some other factor, such as the extent of
insurance or the identity of the potential defendant, effects that are analyzed below.
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Insurance Policy Limits

As a matter of economic theory or tort law, there is no reason
why the size of a defendant's liability insurance policy should affect a
victim's recovery. As a practical matter, though, insurance could be a
relevant factor. By expanding a defendant's assets, insurance permits
a recovery when a defendant is insolvent, reduces a plaintiffs
collection costs, and increases a defendant's willingness to pay.
Second, insurance changes the litigation dynamic by shifting control
from a defendant to an insurer and by fractioning responsibility for
defense and settlement between them. Typically, the insurer, a repeat
player in litigation with sufficient wealth to try or settle the claim,
assumes the defense of a case and decides whether to settle within
policy limits. Unsurprisingly, then, a prior study using medical
malpractice payments in the TCCD found that recoveries "stack up" at
the insurance policy limits and recoveries above these limits are
rare. 120 Dean Syverud suggests that "as policy limits increase, larger
judgments and settlements tend to result.. . because the amount of
insurance affects both the litigants in their negotiations and the
121
factfinders in their judgments."
Prior research suggests two conclusions: First, payments on
insured claims are likely to exceed those on uninsured claims; second,
payments on insured claims will correlate positively with policy size.
We cannot test the first conclusion using the TCCD, because it
contains only insured claims. We can test the second by comparing
death claims covered by policies of different sizes. This analysis is
complicated by the fact that a number of claims involve multiple
defendants. The data report only claims against individual policy
limits, not combined policy limits, and hence do not reveal the true
limit of insurance coverage in these cases. To test this conclusion, we
first isolate the cases with only one applicable policy and examine the
magnitude of the payments for death as a ratio of the insurance policy
limit.122 If few claims provide payments exceeding the policy limit, this
may suggest that the policy limit is artificially restraining recoveries.
Figure 4 graphically displays the association of policy limits in single
defendant cases, showing the ratio of payment as a ratio of the policy
limit.

120. See Black et al., supra note 116.
121. Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1635
(1994).
122. The ratio is expressed in deciles, e.g., payments <0.1 of policy limits, payments between
0.1 and 0.2 of policy limits, etc. Payments of more than the policy limit (>1.0) are expressed as
"2".
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Figure 4
Payments in Relation to InsurancePolicy Limits in
Single Defendant Cases
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These results confirm the relevance of policy limits for
settlement payouts. The most common payment amount (20%) is a
small fraction of the policy limits, less than 0.1. Payments decline
until approaching the policy limits (ratio of 0.9 to 1), where they spike
up to 13.8%. Only 2.2% of the claim payments exceeded the policy
limits in these single defendant cases.
These summary statistics appear to show that policy limits
have a significant impact on the size of recoveries. The fact that the
payments stack up at the policy limit at least suggests that the system
causes many plaintiffs to choose to settle for the maximum insurance
available, rather than pursue the defendant for additional recovery.
This effect only influences about ten percent of the claims, however.
While the theoretical basis for such a relationship is unclear, it is
conceivable that policy limits are influencing recoveries at ratios below
1.0 as well.
The next analysis includes multiple defendant cases. The data
here do not permit as clean a test of the policy limits because the
recovery is measured against only one of the multiple insurance
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policies on which the plaintiff may possibly recover (assuming more
than one defendant carries insurance). However, the results can
illuminate the extent to which insurance policy limits are holding
down potentially deserving award. If the payments in excess of policy
limits are greater in this analysis, where an additional policy may be
available, it would suggest that policy limits are in fact constraining
meritorious recoveries. Figure 5 illustrates recoveries in relation to
single policy limits in multiple defendant cases, using the same
procedure as the preceding figure.
Figure 5
Payments in Relation to InsurancePolicy Limits in
Multiple Defendant Cases
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This result confirms the finding that policy limits restrain
recoveries. The percent of payments in excess of a single policy limit
jumps to 17.9%. Moreover, we still see a spike at the individual policy
limit (8.8%), which suggests that these payments may also be affected
by insurance policy limits in multiple defendant claims. This may
suggest that the other defendant was uninsured or that the claimant
received payments at the limits of both policies. From this data, we
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can make an inference that over twenty percent of claims may be
123
undercompensated because of policy limits.
Moreover, these results indicate that the low ratio payments
may possibly be influenced by the policy limits. In single defendant
cases, about seven percent fewer cases settle for less than twenty
percent of the individual policy limit, even though these claims may
also involve additional recovery from the additional available
insurance policy. There are alternative explanations for this finding,
however. It may be that claims against multiple defendants
intrinsically tend to be more meritorious and hence likely to settle for
greater sums. Another more likely explanation of this result might
involve the type of defendants and the nature of the claims. For
example, medical malpractice claims more typically involve only one
policy, and these claims may settle for less. It is possible to control for
this effect through a multiple regression that incorporates both the
policy limit and the nature of the potential defendant of the claim,
which we provide below.
3. Location of Injury
Another possible factor influencing payment amounts is the
county in which the claim would proceed to trial. Certain locations in
Texas have a reputation for awarding higher damages in trials. Some
have even been described as "judicial hellholes" by the American Tort
Reform Association ("ATRA"). 124 Over the past three years, the ATRA
has designated four Texas counties-Jefferson, Hidalgo, Nueces and
Starr-as such judicial hellholes. 125 These counties are all relatively
poor. Three are located near the border with Mexico, and the fourth is
located in East Texas, near Louisiana.
ATRA's designation calls to mind the "folk wisdom" that
126
minorities "favor injured plaintiffs and give them inflated awards."'
123. Syverud suggests a contrary explanation, that policy limits may be unduly high due to
the interests of insurers and the plaintiffs' bar. See Syverud, supra note 121, at 1649-50. Our
results do not particularly support this explanation, though, as policy limits appear to serve as a
ceiling, but not any sort of a floor, for settlement compensation payments, and the absolute
amount of such payments in death cases is quite low.
124. ATRA, Judicial Hellholes 2005, http://www.atra.org/report/hellholes/ (last visited Sept.
1, 2006). The ATRA website reports that "[p]ersonal injury lawyers seek out these places because
they know that they will produce a positive outcome-an excessive verdict or settlement, a
favorable precedent, or both." Id. These counties were identified using a survey of ATRA
members and comprehensive follow up research. Id.
125. Id.
126. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a
Bronx Effect, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2002). The authors' empirical study, though, found little
support for such an association. Id. at 1869. See also Michael J. Saks, Trial Outcomes and
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In Texas, there is a common belief that Hispanic juries favor plaintiffs
and provide them high awards. Some empirical analysis supports this
127
demographic effect in trials and settlements.
A county's wealth could influence payments, separately or
conjointly with ethnicity. Wealthier individuals tend to place a greater
economic value on life, and wealthy jurors may therefore tend to issue
larger damage awards in tort cases. Alternatively, poor persons might
be more generous jurors because they see trials as opportunities to
transfer wealth from rich defendants to poor persons like themselves.
This temptation might be especially strong in the cases covered by the
TCCD because they involve commercial defendants.
Texas has 299 counties. Some have hundreds of death cases,
while others have few. To test the effect of location, we used several
dummy variables. First, we created a "hellhole" variable with a value
of 1 for the four ATRA hellhole counties and a value of 0 for all others.
Second, we created a "Hispanic" variable for counties in which the
Hispanic population was over 80%.128 Given the demographic
breakdown of Texas, this also serves as a rough proxy for poverty.
Third, we created a "wealthy" variable to separate out counties with
higher average incomes. In 2000, the median income of Texans was
$28,313. Eight counties of the state had median incomes of more than
$35,000, and they were coded as wealthy.
4. Potential Defendant
A final factor that might influence payments in death cases is
the identity of the potential defendant on whose insurance the claim
was made. Although defendant type should have no legal bearing on
compensatory damages in death cases, some defendants may tend to
be more tortious and therefore more liable or more exposed to punitive

Demographics: Easy Assumptions Versus Hard Evidence, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1877, 1878 (2002)
(discussing lack of data supporting presumption of association).
127. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race Poverty, and American Tort Awards:
Evidence from Three Datasets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (2003). The study found that a one percent
increase in the Hispanic poverty rate of a county raised trial awards by up to seven percent and
settlements by over two percent. Id. at 50, 52. See also Frank A. Sloan, Limiting Damages for
"Pain and Suffering" in Medical Malpractice, 64 N.C. MED. J. 191, 192 (2003) (pointing to
"empirical evidence that patterns of awards reflect the income, racial, and ethnic composition of
the area in which cases are tried").
128. These counties are Brooks County, Cameron County, Dimmit County, Duval County, El
Paso County, Hidalgo County, Jim Hogg County, Maverick County, Presidio County, Starr
County, Webb County, Willacy County, Zapata County, and Zavala County. 2000 census
demographic data for the variable came from http://www.txcip.org/tac/census/index.php. The
eighty percent cutoff was used because any materially lower cutoff (e.g., fifty percent) would
capture most of the state.

2006]

IN TEXAS, LIFE IS CHEAP

1913

damages claims. Some types of defendants may be systematically
richer than others. Given the widespread (though rarely evidenced)
belief that jury awards reflect the depth of defendants' pockets,
defendant type could affect payment amounts. 129 Jurors may also find
certain types of defendants relatively attractive or repugnant because
of the nature of their activities.
The TCCD contains twenty-six categories of "business class as
policyholder," which presumably identifies the nature of the potential
defendant for the claim. The raw data suggest that there may well be
some effect here. For example, the mean payment in the 3425 claims
against physicians and surgeons is only $304,183, an amount that is
less than for other claims, with statistical significance at the .01 level.
By contrast, the mean payment in the 1047 claims against
construction firms is $516,928, an amount that is greater than that for
other claims, also with statistical significance at the .01 level. These
differences might be related to other features of the claims, such as
age of the deceased, so we incorporate them into a broader analysis
below.
To test the effects of the different potential defendants on
awards, we have regrouped the TCCD categories into ten categories of
related businesses that roughly parallel Standard Industrial
Classification ("SIC") codes, each of which has at least two hundred
TCCD-recorded payments in death cases. These categories for
potential defendants are: Agriculture; Mining and Oil Production;
Construction; All Manufacturing; Transportation; Wholesale and
Retail Sales; Apartment and Office; Municipal and Nonprofit; Medical;
and Daycare and Nursing Homes. As with the county location section,
each of these categories is analyzed as a dummy variable in a
regression against other categories of defendants. In one case, the
results are influenced by legislative action. In 1977, Texas imposed a
cap on damages for medical malpractice wrongful death actions of
$500,000, adjusted for inflation. 130 Adjusted for the 1988 dollars used
in our study, damages were capped at $975,000.
5. Cumulative Multiple Regression
Our analysis closes with a capstone regression that considers
locational and defendant effects, incorporated with all the prior
129. There is some empirical evidence that damage awards are greater when the defendant
is a (presumably deep pocket) corporation. Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial
Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 208 (1985).
130. See TEX. H.R., HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., Focus REPORT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

PROPOSED FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT 32 (2003) (discussing history of legislation).
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potential determinants of payments in death cases. We report several
different equations with different sets of independent variables, as
follows:
1. The variables age and age-squared (to capture the quadratic nature of age-related
payments), employment status, and whether the death was work-related.
2. The variables of equation (1) plus the potential defendant categories.
3. The variables of equation (2) plus the county locational categories
4. The variables of equation (3) plus the insurance policy limits, for the limited number
of cases with a single defendant.

The distribution of payments in the TCCD is somewhat
skewed, clustered toward lower amounts with a long right tail of
higher payments. Consequently, we use a log scale for payment
amount to yield a more normal distribution pattern. Table 5 reports
the results of the four equations on death payments, with the
statistical significance for each independent variable.

Table 5
Determinants of Payments for Loss of Life
Age
Age-Squared
Employed
Work-related
Agriculture
Mining/Oil
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Sales
Apt/Office
Munic/Nonprofit
Medical
Daycare/Nursing
High Income
Hellhole
Hispanic
PolicyLimit
Observations
R-squared

.008 (4.74)***
-.012 (5.91)***
.225 (8.19)***
.145 (4.23)***

.009(5.18)***
-.014 (6.88)***
.204 (7.48)***
.064 (1.71)*
-.215 (2.41)**
.213 (2.87)***
.080 (1.58)
.201 (3.75)***
.146 (3.09)***
.012 (0.25)
-.085 (1.17)
-.663 (11.44)***
-.037 (1.01)***
.209 (3.55)***

.009 (5.06)***
-.013 (6.67)***
.208 (7.64)***
.061 (1.63)
-.216 (2.44)**
.219 (2.97)***
.073 (1.45)
.177 (3.30)***
.147 (3.12)***
.002 (0.05)
-.094 (1.30)
-.670 (11.45)***
-.046 (1.27)***
.208 (3.55)***
.070 (3.03)***
.167 (4.35)***
.155 (4.19)***

11,502
.0318

11,502
.0515

11,502
.0562

.006 (2.29)**
-.009 (3.36)***
.212 (5.48)***
-.097 (1.80)
.045 (0.41)
.132 (1.32)
.212 (3.11)***
.112 (1.38)
.240 (4.08)***
.100 (1.58)
-.085 (0.89)
-.524 (7.32)***
-.147 (2.87)***
.083 (1.15)
.041 (1.20)
.174 (2.83)***
.048 (.082)
.299 (18.17)***
4896
.1386

These extensive regressions permit some fairly clear
conclusions. First, the effect of age and employment is exactly as
predicted and consistently at a level of statistical significance. This is
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consistent with the legal rules and suggests that settlements are
indeed occurring in the shadow of the law. Second, payments
systematically vary by type of defendant, though there is no obvious
legal basis for this (save for the medical malpractice statutory cap).
The greater payments in some industries might be evidence that some
defendants are perceived as unsympathetic, though it may also be due
to some relevant feature of the deceased that our model did not
capture. Third, payments vary by county as predicted by our
hypotheses. High income counties, judicial "hellholes," and counties
with high Hispanic populations seem to have higher payments in
death cases but only the effect of being in a "hellhole" was statistically
significant once policy limits were incorporated in the equation,
though there is no good legal or theoretical reason for this effect.
Fourth, policy limits appear to be a very significant determinant of
payments, at least in the single-defendant cases for which we can
measure them. Once again, this is theoretically and legally
inappropriate, as it enables defendants to limit compensation without
regard to damages or liability.
The settlement data analyzed in this regression do not directly
tell us the precise value of life in Texas tort litigation, because the
payments are colored by factors such as the strength of the plaintiffs
legal case. However, they do permit us to extract a rough life
valuation. The theoretical discussion above suggests that the
probability of plaintiff victory in a settled case is at least 50%, and
probably higher. If we adjust the settlement payments accordingly
(based on a 50% probability of success), the actual life valuation in tort
settlements would be a median of nearly $400,000 and a mean of over
$800,000. This analysis is, of course, quite speculative but allows some
very rough measure of the value of life in Texas.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF LITIGATION VALUATION OF DEATH IN TEXAS

One major purpose of tort law is the deterrence of harm. 131 For
such deterrence to function appropriately, those who cause externality
damages, such as death, should bear the costs of those damages by
internalizing them. This is necessary to create the correct economic
incentive to avoid causing death. 13 2 For the "optimal allocation of
131. See, e.g., WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 10 (1987) (discussing the deterrent effect of tort law); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 133-34 (1987) (stating that liability rules can create "incentives to
reduce risks").
132. See, e.g., Erin Ann O'Hara, Note, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors
Getting Away with Murder?, 78 GEO. L.J. 1687, 1690-91 (1990) (noting that torts "can be used to
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resources from the standpoint of society," it is necessary that "the firm
1 33
bear the full cost of its actions."
A. The Overall Value of Life in Tort Compensation
If we wish to provide optimal economic deterrence of deathcausing behavior, the evidence on payments from the TCCD suggests
that the current tort compensation system falls woefully short. The
payments in death cases are less than $200,000. At this level, loss of
life is substantially undercompensated, according to the best available
measures, such as the VSL calculations, at a level less than ten
percent of even the lower figures. This creates an insufficient economic
incentive for potential defendants to engage in economically efficient
measures to avoid causing deaths. 134 The insufficient incentive is
compounded by the fact that a significant number of plaintiffs with
meritorious claims do not even sue for damages. 135 Thus, this
inefficiency might be reduced by the use of VSL estimates as a
measure of hedonic damages to be recovered by plaintiffs in wrongful
death cases.
Some commentators have suggested that the VSL research be
used to provide a compensable hedonic damage measure in wrongful
death cases for economic or moralistic reasons. 136 Under their theory,
the studies on VSL could be admitted at trial to provide a hedonic
value that the judge or jury might use as evidence of damages to be
awarded. These suggestions have provoked responsive criticisms. The
central early criticism of this practice was presented by Thomas
Havrilesky, a Professor of Economics at Duke, who contends that a
"professional consensus" questions the use of VSL studies. 137 His
central criticism is that the VSL studies are calculated based on the

help society reach an efficient level of risk-imposing activities" and that the system does a
"particularly poor job" in death cases of "forcing tortfeasors to internalize all the costs of their
activities").
133. Roy F. Gilbert, The Application of Hedonic Models to Personal Injury Litigation, J.
LEGAL ECON., Winter 1994, at 20.
134. See, e.g., Thomas R. Ireland & James D. Rodgers, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful
Death/SurvivalActions: Equitable Compensation or Optimal Life Protection?, J. LEGAL ECON.,
Dec. 1993, at 49 (providing a hypothetical example of deterrence: "Would a rule limiting damages
to $578,988 [calculated based on a 40-year old earning $35,000/year] provide too little incentive
for care to be taken by a potential malfeasor? Yes.").
135. See supra pp. 122-23.
136. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in
Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1990) (defending the use of hedonic damages
in wrongful death litigation); O'Hara, supra note 132 (asserting the value of hedonic measures).
137. Thomas Havrilesky, The Misapplicationof the Hedonic Damages Concept to Wrongful
Death and PersonalInjury Litigation, 6 J. FORENSIC ECON. 93, 93 (1993).
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value placed on the avoidance of relatively small risks of death to
anonymous individuals. He also expresses some concern about the
accuracy of the measures and the considerable business costs that
would be associated with awards based on the multimillion dollar VSL
138
estimates.
Professor W. Kip Viscusi of Vanderbilt has more recently made
the case against use of hedonic considerations in tort law awards for
139
loss of life and elaborated on Professor Havrilesky's arguments.
Professor Viscusi worries that procedures for calculating VSL are illsuited for tort law, as the consideration of individual life value will
140
lead to excessive awards for actual lives rather than statistical ones.
Like Professor Havrilesky, he suggests that the wage premium studies
only value willingness to accept small statistical risks to life and
shouldn't be used for ex post valuation of actual deaths.14 1 While tort
law ordinarily provides the compensation that a victim would demand
to compensate the loss, most individuals would find no amount
satisfactory to compensate for their death. Professor Viscusi notes:
"The value of life is not a total figure that represents the lump sum
amount that one could receive and be indifferent between life and
death." 142 As such, he concludes that value of life estimates are
inadequate for use in litigation. Others have concurred and made
43
similar arguments against the use of hedonic damages measures.
Professor Viscusi finds it reasonable to use such valuation in
determining punitive damages or in finding liability under a riskutility test to determine negligence, and cites the Ford Pinto case as
an example of a situation in which defendants placed too low a value
138. Havrilesky suggests that using such damages could produce awards amounting to ten to
fifteen percent of the national gross domestic product but provides no data to support this claim.
Id. at 97.
139. W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses of Hedonic Values of Life in Legal Contexts, 13
J. FORENSIC ECON. 111 (2000).

140. See id. at 111 (observing that "[s]ociety has long displayed more attention to identified
lives than to statistical lives," and that "[e]ven beached whales and identified animal lives often
command more attention than statistical human lives").
141. Id. at 117. See also W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Has Voodoo Economics Come to
the Courts?, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 1, 10 (1990) (suggesting that an individual's willingness to pay
$600 to avert a 1/10,000 risk of lost life does not necessarily mean that the individual would be
willing to pay $600,000 to eliminate a 1/10 risk).
142. Viscusi, supra note 139, at 119.
143. See, e.g., Ireland & Rodgers, supra note 134, at 45 (suggesting that such damages
cannot be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy and may result in overcompensation);
Raymond, supra note 29, at 84 (noting variability of VSL studies and difficulty of applying them
to individual victims); Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 74, at 1070 (complaining that the
measure is too subjective and scientifically unreliable and provides an "opportunity for plaintiffs'
lawyers to channel a jury's sympathy for an injured person or anger toward a defendant into an
award that is neither subject to statutory limits nor to thorough judicial review").
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on life in their ex ante cost-benefit calculations. 144 Of course, the
reason that Ford placed an overly low value on life in these
calculations was because it anticipated that liability awards would be
at that low value. Professor Viscusi's attempt to cure the deterrence
problem by use of life value in liability determinations fails because an
economically rational Ford would have made precisely the same
calculations under his regime, knowing that, though it would be liable,
actual damages awards would be relatively small.
The above criticisms focus on the extension of calculations
based on the value of avoidance of small ex ante risks to the ex post
valuation of particular lost lives. There is considerable variation in
VSL estimates, and no single estimate is necessarily reliable for a
particular person. 145 This criticism seems to fail to appreciate that the
ex post valuation of death in litigation is commonly the byproduct of
some ex ante decision by defendants to risk the death of others. At the
time of the ex ante decision, the particular identity of the victim is
unknown, so particularized individual VSLs are not crucial for
deterrence purposes. Professor Viscusi has previously noted that while
the appropriate settlement compensation for a lost life may be
$300,000, "the appropriate value of life from the standpoint of
146
prevention may be an order of magnitude higher."'
In addition, the ex ante small risks are not divorced from the
eventual loss of life. For the individual employees studied in the wage
premium studies, it is the "knowledge of the value of a whole life" that
is important in their calculations. 147 Moreover, as the risk level
increases, more closely approximating the loss of a whole life, it
148
appears that the relative risk premium actually becomes greater.
Thus, the anonymous statistical life based on small risk studies on
balance probably causes some undervaluation of death.
The critics have stressed that VSL estimates are averages for
an anonymous life and cannot, therefore, be directly translated to
individual lives lost. Thus, Professor Havrilesky argues that they are
inapplicable because "they do not reflect the decisions of a unique
individual" whose life was lost. 1 49 The generalized measures of the
144. Viscusi, supra note 139, at 122.
145. See Raymond, supra note 29, at 84 (suggesting that the generalized VSL estimates are
inapplicable to particular individuals).
146. Viscusi, supra note 93, at 174.
147. Gilbert, supra note 133, at 17.
148. See id. at 18 (noting that "the incremental demand for compensation for an increase in
risk becomes higher at very high risk levels"). While there is a potential theoretical flaw in the
VSL studies to the extent that workers might overestimate small probabilities of injury, this
does not appear to be an accurate premise. Id. at 21.
149. Havrilesky, supra note 137, at 95.

20061

IN TEXAS, LIFE IS CHEAP

1919

value of a statistical life cannot capture the damages suffered by the
particular deceased. Even if the average VSL is an imprecise measure
of hedonic damages in a particular case, we can fairly draw the
conclusion that the average compensation provided by the tort system
is far too low, given the VSL measures. Indeed, even those measures
probably underestimate the economic value of lost life and represent
"lower bound estimates of the average value of life." 150 Thus, VSL
calculations based on relatively small risks would often understate the
true value of a particular lost life and better capture the value of that
life than prevailing standards which assign zero value to hedonic life
benefits.
There are two theoretically plausible reasons why the VSL
measures might actually result in overdeterrence. First, the VSL
calculation may involve some double-counting. Thus, a wage premium
could compensate in part for anticipated pain and suffering that would
be calculated as part of noneconomic damages in traditional tort
litigation. Hence, allowing recovery for both noneconomic damages
and hedonic damages measured by VSL could involve double-counting
of damages. Second, if VSL were to precisely capture the costs of
death-causing, it could result in overdeterrence by failing to calculate
other external costs of death-causing suffered by potential defendants.
Liable tortfeasors internalize costs to at least some degree through
nonlegal pathways. Fines, criminal penalties, and reputational losses
for causing death are also costs internalized by a defendant. 151 Adding
a perfectly accurate VSL calculation to the costs already partially
internalized through the other pathways would produce an overinternalization of these externalities, and thus overdeterrence of
death-causing.
The critics' arguments against VSL measures for hedonic
damages have some theoretical validity as a methodological matter,
but they are not terribly significant as a policy matter. Centrally,
those who emphasize shortcomings of the extrapolation never balance
them against the shortcomings of the status quo. The overdeterrence
argument based on fines, penalties, and reputational effects is
unaccompanied by any evidence on the frequency with which those
who cause death suffer such consequences. A theoretical criticism that
use of VSL would over-deter by some uncertain amount adds little to
the substantive policy debate without some evidence of its scope,
150. Gilbert, supranote 133, at 23.
151. Ireland & Rodgers, supra note 134, at 50; Paul H. Rubin & John E. Calfee,
Consequences of Damage Awards for Hedonic and Other Nonpecuniary Losses, 5 J. FORENSIC
ECON. 249, 255 (1992). For a more generalized discussion of this effect, see PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT
REFORM BY CONTRACT 82-84 (1993).
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combined with a comparison of the degree to which the status quo may
under-deter. By virtually every available quantitative measure, the
status quo undercompensates survivors for death and, in the process,
sends an inappropriate signal to potential defendants about actions
that cause risk of death. If prevailing compensation is vastly low, some
152
use of VSL may improve the situation.
B. The Determinantsof the Value of Life in Tort Compensation
The preceding section demonstrates that claim payments are
significantly associated with certain variables that can be measured
with the TCCD. The age and employment variables are related to the
size of recovery in the way that one would expect under the legal
standards of tort law, but theoretically more dubious for life valuation
and deterrence purposes. The other determinants, such as insurance
policy limits, location, and potential defendants, are inappropriate
under either legal or theoretical rationales. Their effect is perhaps
153
unsurprising but nonetheless undesirable.
Many of the determinants seem inappropriate, whether the
concern is equity or efficiency. Basing compensation for a lost life on
features such as insurance policy limits or the characteristics of the
defendant seems to violate horizontal equity, as these features are
154
apparently unrelated to the actual damages suffered by plaintiffs.
Economic efficiency is compromised because some types of defendants
will be led to take relatively more expensive precautions to protect life,
while others will reject measures of comparable cost. Specifically, the
significance of insurance policy limits is especially troubling because it
provides potential defendants with an incentive to underinsure for
causing loss of life, and thereby manipulate the tort compensation
system.
The use of a more standardized measure for life valuation, like
VSL, could reduce the arbitrary and inappropriate aspects of such

152. See O'Hara, supra note 132, at 1709-10 (noting that even if the VSL could not be
actually calculated, its rough approximation would be preferable to ignoring the hedonic value of
life).
153. See Sloan, supra note 127, at 192 (reporting that in malpractice cases, damages seem
determined by "factors that should have no bearing on the individual plaintiffs loss" and noting
that this creates problems for insurers, in addition to any horizontal inequities).
154. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb
in Tort: Scheduling "Painand Suffering" 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 924 (1989) (reporting on lack of
horizontal equity in noneconomic damages awards); Mark Geistfeld, Placinga Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83
CAL. L. REV. 773, 777 (1995) (describing considerable variance in awards for equally severe
injuries).
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valuation in the judicial system. Although some factors, such as
economic losses, will inevitably vary for the deceased, the central
hedonic value of life should not vary based on insurance policy limits,
location, or the potential defendants available. The following Section
addresses how the use of VSL measures in the tort compensation
system could provide more appropriate compensation levels, reducing
the arbitrary and inappropriate determinants of payments.
C. Tort Reform in Death Cases
In general, the tort reform movement has been aimed at
reducing damage awards. In death cases, at least, this direction is
perverse-the tort law system significantly and systematically
undercompensates loss of life. This undercompensation undermines
deterrence and encourages the creation of unduly high risks of death.
As such, in this sense, the tort compensation system in Texas (and
presumably elsewhere) is malfunctioning and requires reform in the
direction of expanding awards in cases where death resulted from
negligence or other tortious action.
The undercompensation of death in tort may be partially due to
inherent features of the liability system, which restricts damages and
commonly excludes any recovery for hedonic losses. This structural
flaw can create a truly perverse incentive, in which defendants are
economically encouraged to cause a death in lieu of an especially
serious injury, for which it must compensate the victim, not the
survivors. Addressing this problematic incentive would require either
a radical shift in precedent or statutory reform of the system.
Irrationalities in compensation are another shortcoming of the
prevailing tort compensation system. There is no good reason under
the law why awards should vary significantly depending on factors
such as the identity of the defendant, the amount of insurance
coverage available, or the situs of the injury. To some degree, such an
effect is an inevitable consequence of the system's reliance on the
judgment of humans. But the magnitude of this arbitrariness may be
minimized through structural reforms.
The ideal structure for statutory reform of the tort system
would be to create a system somewhat like that established by the
Special Master to compensate survivors of those who died in the 9-11
attacks. The legislature could create a schedule of a presumptive
minimum award for loss of life based in part on the VSL studies. The
schedule would not guarantee payments of a certain amount to all of
the deceased as in the 9-11 case. Rather, it would guarantee payments
of a certain amount to all those with fully meritorious legal claims.

1922

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:6:1875

One might expect settlements to be for less than the scheduled
amount, given the uncertainty of a claim's merits, but the scheduled
amount would set the starting point from which such settlement
amounts would be determined.
The creation of such a presumptive award would have some
advantages over allowing traditional tort recovery for hedonic
damages. First, it would overcome some of the irrationalities that
appear to influence jury awards, such as the defendant's identity, and
bring some predictability to awards. 155 Second, it would have a
considerable procedural efficiency benefit. 156 There would substantial
unnecessary cost involved in retrying the VSL in every wrongful death
case, which would inevitably involve extensive and expensive expert
testimony. Third, there could be some substantive efficiency benefit to
a presumptive award, as potential tortfeasors would be better able to
calculate the costs of causing death.
The amount of the presumptive wrongful death award should
be considerably more than the small $250,000 award set by the
Special Master. Given our understanding of the value of life from the
economic studies, such as the wage premium analyses, this
presumptive minimum might be set at $2 million for noneconomic
damages. Such a minimum would surely produce much greater
insurance coverage for damages risked by potential defendants. This
in turn would also color settlement negotiations and should result in
significantly increased payouts in this process as well. Thus, a
plaintiff with a 75% probability of winning at trial might be expected
to recover $1.5 million in settlement. The hypothesized $2 million
figure represents only a fraction of the VSL estimates on life and thus
accounts for possible overdeterrence risks. While this proposal would
work a radical change in Texas payouts, it is actually a relatively
conservative figure for the value of lives lost when compared to the
VSL research.
Given the contemporary political realities, passage of tort
reform that increases damage awards seems unlikely. Potential tort
defendants, who are often members of wealthy interest groups, tend to
have greater influence on legislatures. 157 In the absence of legislation,
155. See Ted R. Miller, Willingness To Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 83 Nw. U.
L. REV. 876 (1989) (discussing this benefit of scheduling payments for noneconomic damages).
Such predictability may have "both fairness and efficiency advantages." Avraham, supra note 72,
at 96. Viscusi has argued for the creation of such a schedule to avoid the random arbitrariness
associated with noneconomic damage awards. See Viscusi, supra note 141, at 13-14.
156. See Avarham, supra note 72, at 93 (discussing the high administrative costs of litigating
any pain-and-suffering damages).
157. See Michael R. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 67 (2002) ("The
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a useful intermediate step would be to allow hedonic damages based
on the VSL research in courtrooms. Admittedly, as Professor Viscusi
fears, such an action might well yield very high jury awards for loss of
life and considerable variation among juries. Yet, over the long run,
such a result might prove beneficial. It could stimulate defendants to
favor legislative reform of the sort we propose, in order to protect them
from high jury awards. Altering the judicial system's rules for
measuring damages in death cases could thus provoke a superior
legislatively systematized compensation system.
CONCLUSION
It may seem ethically problematic to attach a price tag to a
human life, but it is a step that legal and political decisionmakers are
required to take in a number of contexts. Ascertaining the proper
value of life, though, is quite difficult. The economic studies on which
such valuation is typically based are flawed and have produced results
with considerable variance. However, they have consistently shown
life valuations in the millions of dollars. Intuitively, this makes sense:
life would seem to possess a value of at least this magnitude.
The tort compensation system, by contrast, provides much
lower compensation to death victims with legitimate claims. The
median recovery in Texas is only about $200,000 per case, which is
less than five percent of the econometric estimates of life's value. This
extremely low valuation creates a correspondingly small economic
incentive to avoid causing death. In addition, the settlements paid for
loss of life seem to be influenced significantly by theoretically
inappropriate factors. The best way to address these problems is
through a schedule of presumptive damages like that applied in
distributing awards for survivors of 9-11 victims.

Texans for Lawsuit Reform (TLR), one of two principal tort reform lobbying groups in Texas,
received more than half of its Political Action Committee ("PAC") money ($2,850,834) 'from just
20 donors-most of whom made fortunes in toxic chemicals, construction, energy or other
dangerous industries with elevated legal liabilities.' PACs, businesses and individuals affiliated
with TLR and The Texas Civil Justice League, the state's other major tort reform lobby group,
contributed $4.1 million to George W. Bush's two gubernatorial campaigns, outspending every
other special-interest donor."); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-6 nn.19,
21 (1991) (reporting role of businesses and insurance companies in launching a pro-defendant
tort reform campaign).

